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Introduction
Frum an American or European perspective investment abroad

in the Second and Third \forlds looks very much riskier than investment
at home.

Re~ent events in Iran and Poland,among other places,seem to
There

provide drar.iatjc confirmat:ion that these feelings are well founded.

is a lot to worry about: the increased internationalization of investment
in the last decade has enormously raised the exposure of investors to
ris}~s associated with events in many different coui'ltries.
As a consequence of this situation, institutional investors and

public organizations CC'T:.cerned with international investment are devoting
substantial resources to analyzing the risks of investment abroad.

There

have been significant improvements in the collection and dissemination
of data on foreign investment.

Some investors have developed statistical

models that at.terr.pt to C\'aluate the safety of leans to particular cc,untries.
\\'e believe, however, that this activity is unfortunately taking
place without an adequately articulated conceptual frame\\ork that identifies
the funda.r:iental sources of country risk.

This analysis is unlikely to

be very robust if it is not based on appropriate t.heoretical notions.
Without a good specification of what motivates borrowers and lenders it
is difficult to identify which data are important for analyzing country
risk.

In addition, there is no reason to believe that apparent rcgularjties

derived from past d:3ta using econometric models \•!ill contjnue in t'he future

unless these mod2ls are specified using an appropriate theory.
To riakc these points more concrete,

consider the conceptual

W1derpinnings of the debt-service ratio, a widely used indicator of the

safety of loans to LDC's.

Other things equal it seems reason able that

servic e
a countr y has more to gain from defau lt if the ratio of its debt
Yet count ries with the highes t ratios may
to its export s is high.
instea d be the best risks.

A high ratio may merely reflec t other factor s

e.
percei ved by lender s as loweri ng risk and justif ying high debt servic
er chara cteris tics
We cannot .make a meanin gful judgment witho ut both a model of borrow
ure
enhanc ing the proba bility of defau lt given a partic ular debt struct
and a model of lender behav ior.

Later in the paper we provid e a more

detail ed critic ism of indica tors of expro priatio n risk.
The purpos e of this paper is theref ore to presen t a microeconomic
ts
framework for analyz ing equili brium in intern ationa l capita l marke
when the riskin ess of foreig n invest ment derive s from the maximizing_
behav ior of borrow ers a1,d lender s.

Witho ut attemp ting to specif y a

ns
compl ete model of these marke ts we presen t some impor tant consid er·atio
risk.
that we believ e have been ·.negle cted in the 1i teratu re on countr y
·.-

tic
We hope that our discus sion will stimu late a more rigoro us and analy
approa ch to this area of study.
In princi ple every conce ivable invest ment (both real and financ ial)
ty,
is unique in terms of chara cteris tics such as expect ed profi tabili
one
safety and liquid ity. Whenever an invest or can invest in more than
an
countr y, however, the issue of countr y risk arises . The choice of
for
invest ment in one countr y rather than anothe r affect s the prosp ects
sense
the invest ment in many ways. Thus, for analy tic purpo ses, it makes

,,.,

;,
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to group investme nts by the country in which they are made.

Imperfe ct

Jc11owl_edge __()f a <:ountry ' s charact eristics that may affect investm ent
outcomes is a major comnonent of country risk.

This uncerta inty can

usually be reduced somewhat by research ,which explains the resource s
allocate d to country risk analysis by private banks, multina tional
corpora tions and internat ional organiz ations such as the ~MF. Neverth eless
even if an investor could gather and assimila te every datum relevan t to
an investme nt much of the uncerta inty associat ed with the nation in
which an investme nt is made would remain.
These are at least two broad reasons why the country in which
an investme nt is made may be of interes t to an investo r.

First,

classify ing investm ents by country is useful in identify ing a group of
investm ents that are likely to have similar charact eristics because
the investme nts are subject to common sources of un~erta inty.

For

instance , a country 's climatic conditio ns may affect the product ivity
of a large number of agricul tural investm ents.

Or, differe nt rates ,.

cf populati on growth may a.1 ter labor market conditio ns.

Learning

about the country then reduces the investo r's subject ive uncerta inty
about a large number of investm ents.

This first form of country risk

analysis provides informa tion on risks which are perceive d as exogenous
1
to the investo r's behavio r.
A second reason for classify ing investm ents by the receipie nt

country derives from the existenc e of nation states.

All investm ents

within a single country share the charact eristic of faJ ling within the

..
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same government's jurisdiction.

The government's policies can

be decisive in determining the return on these investments.

Country

risk associated with government policies and political events such as
war and revolution is called sovereign risk.

Much country risk analysis

thus involves forecasting policies and political developments.

To

some extent the policies of foreign governments and political changes
abroad constitute additional forms of exogenous risk in that they are
affected by factors beyond the investoris control.

A major

component of sovereign risk, however, is endogenous in that it
derives from the strategic behavior of the recipient country's government
toward investors.

We view a government contemplatin~ hostiie acts

against a foreign investor as evaluating the economic costs and benefits
of its actions. 2 The behavior of investors will affect these costs and
benefits, and the strategies that are optimal for the government to·•..
pursue, thus indirectly affecting the return on investments.

Our

analysis in this paper focuses primarily on this second endogenous form
of country risk.
In focusing on the economic aspects of country risk we treat
political and cultural factors as given.

In particular, we assume

that recipient countries have governments that pursue a consistent set

of objectives and that the populace of these countries has an observable
and stable attitude toward foreigners, private property and contracts.
In reality these factors are hard for an investor to evaluate and are

3
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•.

subject to unpredictable changes.
components of country risk.

They thus represent.impo rtant

To some extent we believe that the

economic factors we discuss help explain changes in government and
social attitudes that have consequences for foreign investments, but
we will not argue a position of economic determinism.

.

Instead,

we restrict ourselves to a consideration of the economic costs and

benefits associated with hostile acts because this is a natural
bo·undary for a single inquiry.
One important distinction among investments is between direct
investment implying controlling ownership of a physkal investment or business
abroad and indirect or portfolio investment usu~lly taking the form cf a loan to
an agent in the country, perhaps to the government itself.

In the case

of direct foreign investment the investor faces the possib.ility that
the tax system or other aspects of the legal environment will change.
He may, for instance, find that the hos·t country government requires
the transfer of equity to its own nationals without full compensation
(indigenization programs).

In the extreme, the investor may lose all

control of the investment, suffering uncompensated expropriation.
Indirect investments can be threatened by rescheduling, default or outright repudiatjon.

In the cases of direct investments or a loan

denominated in the currency of the debtor, the investor also faces
the risk that exchange controls imposed by the host country may prevent
the conversion of foreign assets into the investor's own (or indeed a
third) currency.

4

·we believe that country risk, as it applies to direct and indirect
investments, involves some rather separate considerations .

Nevertheless,

both forms of investment can be analyzed within the same general frame
work.

In the next section, we present a general methodology applicable

to both types of investment.

Part 3 discusses issues that are relevant

to portfolio investment while Part 4 treats direct investment.

The

last section draws implication s from our analysis for the design of
public policy.
2.

A Framework for Analyzing Government Policies Toward Foreign
Investment
A crucial aspect of country risk is that a c~untry's government

is a sovereign actor.

Within its own territory a government, especially

if it is relatively unconstrain ed by constitutio nal safeguards, has
great latitude in determining the legal structure surrounding economic
agreements.

Governments are much more able to break contracts than

are individuals operating within a given legal system.

Even outside

their own territories governments may have various sorts of immunity
in the courts of other countries (Lillich 1965, Delupis, 1973 and
Levine, 1977).

Finally, even if a favorable judgment is secured by

investors, there may be little that can be obtained from one country
5
in the jurisdictio n of another, although exceptions exist.
Contrast this situation to the position of a private agent
experiencin g bankruptcy within a domestic legal

cnn~~vt_

L~g~l

proceedings typically strip the agent of some or all of his assets
if he does not meet the obligations imposed by his liabilities .

In

internation al investment, the legal penalties incumbent on an agent
failing to fulfill his contracted obligations are relatively poorly
defined, and the ones that do exist are much more difficult to enforce.
Without a legal system to enforce contracts, investors must find
other mechanisms to ensure that the profitabili ty of their investments
is no~ infringed by hostile governments of the recipient countries.
Without any such mechanism the government would always want to assume

ownership of all foreign assets.

Rational foreign investors , fore seeing

the absence of an adequate mechanism for repaymen t, will avoid the
investmen t.

Only by convincin g potential investors that it-will have

a motive to honor contractu al obligatio ns after their assets·ar e in
place can a country attract investmen t.
From the perspecti ve of a period before an investmen t has been
made, a country is likely to prefer a situation where the investmen t
is made and contracts are respected to a situation of no investmen t.
The problem is that the country may most prefer a third situation :

the

foreign investmen t takes place but the country, rather than the investor,
receives its proceeds. Since the recipien t's decision to honor
contractu al obligatio ns is subsequen t to the investmen t decision, a
situation of perfect capital mobility, in which the real return on capital
is equal in all countries and in which

investmen t contracts ·are honored,

could be time inconsist ent (Kydland and Prescott, 1977):

it wi 11 seem

optimal to the country before the investmen t is made (given the need to
attract investors ) but not after.

Rational investors perceivin g this

problem wil 1 not invest and the country is left in t!1e situation
it least prefers - no fordgn investmen t at al 1.
Occasion ally, investors may invest knowing that time consisten t
behavio:r on the part of the recipient will lead to a los_s of control
This situation can be explained by appealing to the
6
concept of an obsolesci ng bargain : both parties enter into an agree-

over the asset.

ment anticipat ing that a shift in their relative strengths will lead to
a subsequen t renegotia tion.
imply irrationa l behavior.

Such situation s often arise and do not
For instance, an investor building a factory

abroad may realize that the only protectio n against expropria tion is his
monopoly over special knowledge .

It may be that as time passes this

knowledge becomes available to the country, making expropria tion the

strate gy
time consis tent strate gy of the host countr y (i.e.,t he optim al
from that period 's persp ective ).

The invest or may theref ore constr uct

than otherw ise
a smalle r plant, employ ing a more labor- intens ive techno logy
to recoup costs more quickl y.

This behav ior occurs in ~ntici pation

hile
of the takeov er and ensure s that the invest ment is still worthw
to the invest or.

Any reneg otiatio ns (in this case leadin g to expro 

merely
priati on) are fully antici pated ·by both sides and any rhetor ic
veils this fact.

We will use the term obsole scing bargai n to denote

in
a change over time in the shares of the countr y and the invest or
the procee ds of an invest ment.

We assume that both sides act from

ment
the outset with full knowledge of this chara cteris tic of the invest
and that all behav ior is time consis tent.
A coun~r y can attrac t foreig n invest ment only to the extent
ive
that it can convin ce poten tial invest ors that it will have an incent
titive
to allow them to extrac t from the countr y a return that is compe
with what can be earned elsewh ere.

Unless invest ors are convin ced that

l
these incent ives will be strong enough to allow a transf er of capita-,.
,

that equate s rates of return across borde rs, the streng th of the
recip ient's incent ives to repay will constr ain the

n1ovem ent

of capita l.

The weakn ess of a count ry's incent ive to abstai n from hostil e acts
agains t foreig n invest ments is a distor tion

in the world economy in that

ity.
it create s a deviat ion from a situat ion of perfec t capita l mobil
Estab lishin g mechanisms to ensure that invest ments are unharmed
could
may yield furthe r deviat ions from a world in which all contra cts
be enforc ed costle ssly.

The recipi er1t countr y has an incent ive to take

abide
visibl e action s that would reduce its welfar e should it fail to
by cofitra cts.

(In Schel ling's (1959) termin ology the countr y may wish

to provid e foreig n invest ors with a "hosta ge".)

These action s may be

'' '

costly in thems elves.

At the same time invest ors have an incent ive

to modify the form of their invest ment to make any assets they
place
in the foreig n countr y less profit able to other owners .

The oppor tunity to

modify invest ments is greate st in the case of direct invest ments
, but
modif icatio ns also impose costs.

We provid e some examples below.

Within this extral egal contex t of intern ationa l invest ment there
are theref ore incent ives for a recipi ent countr y to avoid hostil
e acts.
Otherw ise no intern ationa l invest ments would take place.
types of invest ments are defend ed in differ ent ways.

Differ ent

Thus countr y

risk cannot be strict ly define d except with regard to a partic
ular
invest ment.

Never theles s, broad classe s of invest ments natura lly share

common attrib utes that allow them to be analyz ed as a group.

One

impor tant partit ion of invest ments ·is betwee n financ ial and physic
al
invest ments threat ened at the extrem e by acts of repud iation
and
expro priatio n respec tively .

While there are simil aritie s in the

situat ions of th~se two types of invest ments , suffic ient differ
ences
exist to justif y separa te treatm ents of each.
One partic ularly impor tant factor protec ting both types of
invest ments is the recip ient's incent ive to mainta in a reputa
tion as a
good place for future im.;es tments .

This incent ive may seem weak or

nebulo us compared to the threat of bankru ptcy procee din~s.

As Arrow

(1975) has argued , howev er, the desire to mainta in a reputa tion
provid es
the basis of much econom ic behav ior outsid e the sphere we consid
er here.·
Our previo us work sugge sts that such an incent ive may allow
some capita l
transf er but not neces sarily enough to equate the margin al produ
ctivity
of capita l among count ries.

3.

Country Risk: Default and Repudiation

7

By far the most important recent trend in private investing
abroad is the rapid growth in financial lending, much of it associated
with the activities of banking syndicates.

Long-ten:i debt to private

creditors owed by the governments of 98 LDC's, :or with repayment guaranteed
8
by them, rose from 36 billion dollars in 1971 to 269 billion in 1979.
Two other categories of loans, the short-term debt owed by governments or
guaranteed by them and all maturities of w:iguaranteed debt owed by private
borrowers in LDC's have also grown raRidly.

Data on these amounts are less

·easily available, however (BIS, 1979).
It is because very little of this debt consists of publicly issued
bonds

that information on these quantities is difficult to obtain.

becomes more serious with regard to the terms of the·loan.

9

This problem

Even when

information is available on the rate of interest, various commissions and
charges are concealed (Wellons, 1977).
The most difficult informational problem arises for an outside
observer in ascertaining if the borrower is complying with the loan contract.
Here again the fact that lending is in forms other than publicly issued bonds
is Grucial.

Thus for the 1930's when widespread defaults on bonds occured

considerable information exists (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981b). In the 1970's~
however, one must rely on press reports and vague rumors.
loans to avoid public admission of a default.

Banks may roll-over

Except perhaps for North Korea,

however, nothing like an outright repudiation has occured in the 1970's.

Costa Rica,

Gabon, Jamaica, Indonesia, Iran, Nicaragua, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Togo,
Turkey and Zaire and other~ have all posed problems_~f. varying seriousncss.

3.1

Credit Constraints and Potential Default:

10

A Conceptual Framework

An \Dlderstanding of what prevents defaults and repudiations and

how these deterrents break down is the central goal of risk analysis
applied to financial lending.

Without coercion or legal sanctions available

,,1'

to them, private lenders might find governments eager to borrow so long
as net flows are positive, but if net repayments are required governments
will repudiate their debts.

The only retaliation open to lenders is to

refuse future loans to repudiating borrowers and, in the case of banks,
to refuse to process their trade related transactions.
On first consideration, a refusal to lend in the future is a
rather weak penalty for a lender trying to realize a non-negative present
value from a loan.

The country already has possession of a certain amount

of funds, and can be assured of a gain if it refuses -repayment.

How can

the lender both offer the borrower an even larger gain and still ensure
that its activities are profitable to itself?

A promise of a larger future

loan in return for present repayment, if kept, would seem only to push the
problem out further in time

(Hellwig, 1977)

In fact, the inability to borrow in the future is likely to impose
hardship on a potential defaulter for a number of reasons that we discuss
below.

The costs of default wil1 vary, of course, across countries while

the benefit is the ability to absorb as domestic consumption or investment
what otherwise would be transferred to foreigners as debt service payments.
The lenders must ascertain- the level of debt service obligations at which
the benefits of non-payment are likely to exc-ee<l the c.osts of future

exclusion from credit markets.

Lenqers will not lend to the point where

debt-service obligations reach this level, at least with high probabi1ity.
This deht ceiling (or "country limit") provides a formal definition of the
"capacity" of international capital markets to finance a country's current
account deficit, a notion frequently arising in d:iscuss:ions of the
recycling of OPEC surpluses.
Elsewhere (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981b) we identify four reasons
why a country may want to borrow in financial markets on a repeated basis;
each points to a cost to defaulting.

First of all, borrowing allows a

country to divorce its level of consumption from its level of income at

·-

any moment, given its level of savings.

A country whose income l~vei varies

widely is ,most likely to borrow for this purpose.
consumption motive.

We identify it as the

By defaulting and thereby losing access to future

opportunities to borrow a country increases the variability in its
consumption, which is costly as long as the marginal utility of income
is decreasing.
The following example, based on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a), illustrates
how the consumption motive for borrowing can sustain an equilibrium in
which there is international lending with repayment.

Consider a country with

an income that alternates between a low and a high value indefinitely.
type of country will want to borrow in poor years.

This

It may then be willing

to repay in good years to keep open the option of borrowing yet again in
future poor years when additional resources are esp~cially valuable to it.
If the borrower's income varies in a regular and perfectly predictable
way rational and fully informed lenders will always set the credit ceiling
so that it is never to a debtor's advantage to default.

Although defaults

will never be observed under these assumed circumstances, the threat of
default will limit the amount that any country can be lent.

If the amount

a country ~ishes to borrow, even if it has to repay, exceeds this ceiling,
the country will be credit constrained.

In this case, its inability to

guarantee repayment (because to repay would be time inconsistent) reduces
its welfare.

An increase in the variability of the country's income will

increase its credit ceiling and, if it is constrained, its welfare.
If more is lent than the credit ceiling, it will always be in
the country's interest to refuse repayment.

Only if lenders misperceive a

borrower's characteristics, for instance the amount it has borrowed or the
future path of its income, will default occur.

This points to an important role

.

for the ·country risk analyst - understanding the resource base of a country,
the sources of fluctuation in_output (e.g. weather), the future productivity
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of public sector investments such as irrigation dams, and the sources of
fluctuation in internation al prices for the country's output.
In actuality since a country's income varies in an uncertain fashion,
the possibility of default must be considered.

Unner conditions of

uncertainty , a country may experience sequences of poor income perfonnance .
Debt contracted at the beginning of the sequence. mav then come due while
low incomes persist.

Other things equal, a country will be most tempted

to default when income is low and the marginal utility of income is high.
If a country experiences a series of low incomes, lenders can
adopt one of sever;al responses.

They can set the credit ceiling so low

that the country 1.:ill always choose to repay regar::less of its incor:1e per
formance in the years when net repayment is due.

In this case, it is possible

that very little can be lent.
Alternative ly, creditors can demand repayment after a certain
nu::iber of periods, regardless of income performance and with the knowledge
that. a default will occur if income happens to be lo':: on the due date.

In

this case, a risk premium will be charged so that t:ie lender is indifferent
bP.tween a loan to a country that may refuse repayment and a safe domes-tic
loan.

This type of arranger,1ent characteriz es the contract embodied in a

publicly issued_bond , where no provision is made for postponing the service
of the debt if the debtor experiences a low incone.
A third option for lenders is to refinance the debt if the country

experiences low income, without future exclusion fron borrowing.

Reschedulin ~

postpones repayment to periods when income has ret~:-:ied to normal levels.
This policy requires that lenders have enough information to distinguish
between the occurrence of low and high incomes, and between exogenous short

falls in income and chronic economic mi_smanagernent or other factors within
the country's control that impair long-run performance .

In the latter case,

lenders will, want to threaten an end to refinancing (roll-over) of the debt

and permanent exclusion from credit markets in order to force the government
to change its policies and to repay its debt.

This situation suggests a role

for the IMF as an architect of the policy reorganization or "stabilization
plan" (Srodes,

1977).

If lenders are unable to threaten a~y sanctions,

the situation effectively becomes one where the country refuses to pay
but is not penalized.

In this case, lending becomes impossible.

Thus

there is a cost to making loans in these market; associated with monitoring
economic conditions in borrowing countries and the economic performance of
their governments.

Economies of scale in developing this type of expertise

provide one justification for an IMF role.
A second reason for borrowing arises when there is a large differential
between the domestic marginal product of capital and the world cost of
capital.

Borrowing to increase the capital stock will thus raise income

above the level of debt service obligations imposed by the.debt.
this the productive or investment motive· to borrow.

We call

Countries that

anticipate lucrative investment opportunities into the indefinite future,
especially ones that will require increasing levels of investment,will find
it desirable to retain access to international financial markets.
In the appendix to this paper we develop a model to illustrate how
the production motive for borrowing provides a ?t1echanism In Pnfnrre

ment and establishes a debt ceiling.

Many of the considerations that apply

to the consumption motive are relevant here as well.

Furthemore, this

analysis suggests that countries with good investment opportunities and
meager sources of domestic savings are likely t0 sustain greater levels
of indebtedness.Th is result points to a role for the country risk analyst
in evaluating the future productivity of potential capital investment projects.
We- identify a third motive for borrowing as the adjustment motive.
country may experience sudden, unanticipated reductions in output supply.
While these may require changes in the permanent level of absorption,
•f

A

... , .

adjustment is likely to be less painful when it cah be made slowly.
Borrowing permits a smoother transition.

An example of a cost imposed

by a sudden adjustment of absorption is the need to abondon a project
in progress.

Through borrowing, a country may.complete these projects

even thour-h income may have fallen drastically.
Finally, borrowing can provide 1 iquidity to facilitate international
transactions.

Recent growth in the use of credit cards by individuals

illustrates how a medium of exchange can take the form of a liability
rather than an asset of the buyer.

An individual may find it more

convenient to borrow rather than to run down cash reserves even if he
has no desire to increase current consumption at the cost of future
consumption.

In a very similar way suppliers' credits serve as a medium

of exchange in international markets.

This reason for borrowing we call

the transactions motive.
Countries that are excluded from international financial markets
have difficulty effecting international transactions.

If banks and other

creditors ·refuse ..:o process transfers of funds or extend credit for the
imports or export& of a defaulter, the debtor may be reduced to combersome
transaction methods and, in the extreme, to the inefficiencies of inter
national barter.

Iran in the autumn of 1979 was reported to be having

this type of difficulty after banks declared its revolutionary government
in default.

Otter factors the same, therefore, a borrower that benefits

greatly from trade and that would suffer a corresponding loss from trade disruption
will be allowed a high credit ceiling.

This type of country is likely to have

11
. .
.
. o f imports
to income.
a hi gh ratio
As a final point we emphasize that punishing a defaulter by allowing
it to borrow only at a higher interest rate afterwards cannot be an
adequate deterrent to default and may simply invite the cotmtry to obtain

additio nal princip al on which to defaul t again.
being paid, is irrelev ant.

The higher intere st, not

A higher intere st rate on the initia l loan

can, howeve r, play a role when penalt ies ensure that repaym ent will occur
in at least some situati ons.

In this case, ris~-ne utral lenders will set

to
the intere st rate so that the probab ility of repaym ent times the amount
be repaid just equals the gross return that can be made on a safe loan.

lf

a
lender s are risk-av erse, of course , the intere st rate will be set at
higher rate.

3.2

12

The Effecti veness of Incenti ves to Repay: The Case of Peru
While space prohib its an analys is of the recent history of all

problem borrow ers, much can be learnt from one case, that of Peru.

This

country has figured promin ently during the last, fifteen or so years in
both dispute s over exprop riation and fears of defaul t.

We begin by

consid ering Peru's more recent borrow ing experie nce and turn in the next
section to aspects of the earlie r exprop riation story.

Both episod es

of
illustr ate the interpl ay betwee n econom ic and politic al/lega l aspect s
co\llltry risk.

13

Peru's long-te rm governm ent guaran teed debt to private
lender s increas ed slowly from about 675 million dollars in 1967 to about
725 million dollars in 1971.

In the next four years this debt more than

tripled to roughly 2.3 billion by end 1975 (~orld Bank, vol. 2, 1976,
p. 121 and vol. 1, 1979 p. 47).

These change s occured under a radica l

reform ist militar y governm ent in power from 1968.

By 1976 Peru was in

an econom ic crisis leading to the first of severa l negoti ations on

resche duling .

I

A major cause of this situation was a series of negative
shocks to Peru's trade position: fish meal output dropped because the
anchovies disappeared, widely held expectations of oil discoveries were
disappointed, leaving Peru dependent on imports just as prices rose steeply
and the price of Peru's copper exports dropped.

Cline (1981, p. 304)

estimates that these shocks accounted for 37 percent of the average curren~
account deficit during 1974-77.

Imports of military equipment, a clearly

political factor, accounted for an additional ten oercent of the deficit.
Several large projects proved poor investments.

An 800 million

dollar pipeline was a bad choice since oil reserves were lower than expected.
A one billion dollar irrigation project was judged ill-conceived by the
World Bank and as subsequently unsuccessful by several observers, yet
private bank loans were used to finance it.
The resultant economic crisis caused a new, more moderate
military government to seek additional loans which the banks agreed to only
after negotiating the promise of policy changes.

Cline (1981, p. 306)

concludes: "for reasons of data availability, technical capacity and political
sensitivity, it proved impossible for the banks to enforce their lending
conditions, and adverse publicity for the intervention (plus its ineffectiveness) caused the leading ba.nkers

involved to resolve that they would

not become entangled in the future but would rely on the IMF as the monitoring
authority."

Beginning in early 1977 a series of negotiations with the IMF

led to a policy package implemented in mid-1978.

The next year or so saw:

the application of this package, a drastic fall in real incomes, political
strife, and the reversal of several of the negative trade shocks.

By late

1979 the government could think about prepaying some of the rescheduled debt

-.a. u-
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. . 14
. k : Expropr1at1on
4 • Country R1s
The UN (1978, p. 2?7) estimates the stock of foreign direct
investment in the LDC's at 33 billion dollars in 1967 and 71 billion in

1975.

Although this stock has been growing much less rapidly than the

stock of debt, it still represents a very significant quantity of resources.
Further, it is this type of investment rather than financial lending that
is accompanied by a transfer of technology, so that it represents a contribution
to host-country resources beyond an increase in

real capital.

In contrast to the recent experience with private debt, direct
foreign investments have been subject to hostile actions by the governments
of most countries.

For a large sample of LDC's, Williams (1975, p. 265)

estimates that about twenty pe.rcent of the value of foreign investments
carried into or made during 1956-72 was expropriated without compensation
in this period.

Some countries (Algeria, Bangladesh, Burma, Chile, Cuba,

Egypt, Iraq and Syria) expropriated all or nearly all foreign investments
paying almost no compensation.

Cuba is a striking example, expropriating

1.25 billion dollars in assets and paying 50 million in compensation.
of 1972 it had no foreign investments at all.

As

This case is clearly one

where political factors were uppermost; small changes in the economic costs

and benefits of these actions could hardly have made any difference at all.
A contrasting case is that of Peru, where a radical military govern~ent

took power from a civilian government precisely because the civilians
were judged too lenient in their position on the expropriation of an American
company.

Even under the new government, however, there was no policy of

wholesale expropriation.

The Peruvian case provides many examples where

differences in the positions of individual companies led to very different
fates for their investments.
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4.1 Expropria tion: Some Conceptua l Issues
Physical investmen ts provide more opportun ities than financial
investmen ts to alter the cost benefit calculati on of hostile governme nts.
Perhaps as a result the prospects for an embargo of direct investmen ts
following expropria tion are less.

If their particula r investmen t is

very different from those that have been confiscat ed, potential investors
may feel that the past record of a country is not relevant to their own
situation .

This observati on is more likely to be true when expropria tions
In this case, a

have been selective rather than across-th e-board.

vulnerabl e investor bas little hope that his own fate will alter the host's
reputatio n and cause the host to demur.

Certainly the acrimonio us

expropria tions undertake n by Peru did not lead private banks to withhold
large loans in the early 1970's.

Whatever the ability of banks to act

as a cohesive group in respondin g to threatene d defaults, they show little
inclinatio n to respond to selective expropria tions.

Finally, direct

investmen t is ill-suite d in compar{so n to loans as a method of s~oothing
short-run variation s in income or to facilitat e transacti ons.

As

a.,-;_

consequen ~e, investors in physical assets cannot offer a country these
benefits in exchange for continued access to an investme nt's income.
A broad class of defenses available to the direct investor
involve a cut-off of manageria l expertise and skills.

For instance,

productio n may be conceived as using inputs of unskilled labor, manageri ally
and technical ly-skilled labor, and capital.

The host may lack skilled labor

and capital relative to the rest of the world.

Skilled labor can be

withdrawn in the event of an investmen t dispute; fixed capital cannot be.
If the skilled labor cannot be replaced by the country its income from
the investmen t earned, sal, by unskilled labor or collected in taxes when th8

investment is operated by the investor may exceed the income from seizing
the plant and running it without enough skilled labor.

Only as much capital

as can be protected in this way will be invested if this is the sole defense.
In this case the amount of foreign capital can be less than what the
country would want even if it had to foreswear expropriation in a binding
way.
In this situation, an increase in the skill of the country's
citizens makes the threat of a withdrawal of skilled labor by foreign
investors less meaningful.

Less foreign investment will be undertaken

by investors who protect themselves with this threat.

Indeed, this

effect can be so strong that the contribution to the host's income of
an increase in its citizens' skills could be negativ~.

In any case the

social return is almost certain to be below what is indicated by the
wage differential obtained by a skilled worker.
may be an example of this phenomenon.

India is a country that

With little capital but a large

number of skilled workers, India has a great need for foreign investment
but poses a particular danger to investors relying on a withdrawal of•
skilled labor as a defense against expropriation.

These considerations

also make clear that the threat of expropriation will cause foreign firms
to avoid skill transfer to local nationals.
So far we have identified a defense of foreign investment as
a threat to reduce factor supplies after expropriation.

This is analogous

to the allocative inefficiency discussed in the production efficiency
literature (Forsund et al, 1980).

Another type of defense could involve

the choice of a technically inefficient method of production, one which
would never be efficient a t ~ set of factor prices except for its use
as a defense against expropriation.

To be useful as a defense , this type of distor;i on would have to be more
damaging to a potenti al expropr iator than to the investo r.

An

example

from a similar problem , that of firms trying to protect the product s of
their research and developm ent, has been mentione d to us by Profess or
Stephen Magee.

Firms conscio usly design redunda nt circuits into micro

electron ic compone nts.

The purpose is to confuse co~peti tors trying to

steal the firm's innovat ions, but it is not a costless strategy to implement and therefor e is not socially optimal .

Similar options are open

to foreign investor s trying to ensure that an expropr iating host will
obtain as little as possible from possess ion of the investm ent.
There is little evidenc e on the exact importan ce of these defense s.
Bradley (1977, p. 81) observe s that "Third World countri es·are notoriou sly
adept at locating mercena ry technici ans to manage expropr iated propert ies".

He conclude s on the basis of a large sample of expropr iations that .:'.~he
company 's technolo gy must be advanced and proprie tary before it can .~e
consider ed a signific ant deterren t. =~But characte ri~ing a company 's

technolo gy empiric ally is notorio usly difficu lt.

Micalle f (1981, p. 127)

discusse s one example of an oil company that pursued a strategy of
continuo usly upgradin g its plant even before the return on the investm ent
justifie d it.

By doing so the firm stayed ahead of the expertis e of local

enginee rs,howe ver, at some cost to itself.
ments

using

Examina tion of foreign invest

the techniqu es discusse d by Forsund et al. may be useful in

providin g evidenc~ on the existenc e of various types of technolo gical dis
tortions .

The incidenc e of these distorti ons could then be related to the

expropr iation environm ent.

e diffe rent
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Expropriatio n: The Case of Extractive Industries
Investment in extractive industries may be especially vulnerable

to expropriatio n because it requires much expenditure in prospecting before
any output takes place.

Information about the findings of this activity
At

is difficult to keep secret, especially after production is started.

this point there is very little an investor can do to prevent a host with
the technical capability from taking over the find.

As a consequence ,

companies whose technical advantage lies at the discovery stage may be
reluctant to prospect widely, preferringt o produce less and to protect
current operations by threatening to embargo future exploration .
These difficultie s in defending investments in the extractive
industries suggest that an increase in the potentia,,l for expropriati on can
reduce the rate of extraction.

This conclusion conflicts with that of

Long (1975) who assumes that the probability of expropriati on is exogenous.
His model, however, does not incorporate the exploration process, since
the investor starts with a fixed stock of the resource that is available
to him to use as he pleases until expropriati on occurs.

Furthermore~ - the

cost of extraction in any period is determined only by the absolute amount
extracted in that period.

In this context an investor has an incentive to

get as much out of the ground as fast as possible.

The longer he waits,

the greater the chance that he will lose control of the resource.

If,

however, the threat of expropriati on lowers investment in exploration or capi
tal used in extraction the rate of extraction may fall.

Furthermore , the

rate of expropriatio n may rise if more is invested in these two activities.
Long's results depend partially upon his assumption that country behavior
is exogenous.
incorporate the

Clearly, additional theore-ti cal research is needed to
other effects we have mentioned in a dynamic model of

the type developed by Long.

-25These arguments suggest that the threat of expropria tion may be
more acute in the extractiv e industrie s than in manufactu ring.

If investors

are rational, however, any increased vulnerab ility will be manifeste d in de
creased investmen t and the adoption of more costly defenses. · These effects
are, however, very difficult to measure since one must infer the situation

that

would exist if expropria tion could not occur.

Without the ability to

perform this experimen t, very little can be said about the sectoral incidence of
the distortio ns caused by a host's having the option of expropria tion.

The

actual incidence of acts of expropria tion cannot be a substitut e for this
type of calculatio n.

For instance, the potential for expropria tion may be

so great that no investmen ts are made.

Everyone would agree that resource

allocatio n is greatly affected yet no acts of expropria tion would be observed.
Only if some event occurs which was judged tmlikely at the time
investmen ts were made can the actual incidence 0£ expropria tions be an
appropria te index of the inherent vulnerab ility of different sectors. Perhaps
decoloniz ation and the general post-War weakening of the OECD members as
political and military actors is an experimen t where expropria tion is first·
viewed as impossibl e and then becomes possible.

This type of conjectur e is,

ho,vever, unlikely to ever be susceptib le of meaningfu l testing.

Frequent expropria tions are likely to occur in industrie s that are
either subject to randomnes s in the factors influenci ng the host's decision
or are character ized by the obsolesci ng bargain.

Both cases can be

illustrat ed using the example of a three-inp ut productio n process.

With regard

to uncertain ty, it may be unclear whether the host can acquire the specializ ed

knowledge to run the investmen t.

A risk-neu tral investor will assess the

relevant probabili ties and only invest if the expected value of its profits
is non-nega tive.

If it turns out that knowledge acquisiti on is easy for the

host then it chooses expropria tion and the investor loses; otherwise the
investor earns profits above the risk-free
·, rate.
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-27the amount lost.

There may be system atic biases across sector s i~ the way

asset values are determ ined.

Second , only 1967 rather than 1972 asset

stock figure s are availa ble.

Finall y, it may be that the period since 1972

opinio n
has witnes sed a revers al of these findin gs althou gh Kobri n's
.
(1980, fn.36) implie s that they would actual ly be streng thened
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This situat ion
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5.

Public Policy and Country Ris~

6

The system we have described is character ized by an absence of enforceab le
contracts , by threats and by defensive actions all resulting in impedimen ts
to capital mobility.

Unable to forswear repudiatio n and expropria tion,

capital-im porting countries receive less private capital than otherwise .
The presumpti on is that capital is cheap in the rest of the world relative
to its productiv ity in these countries .

Further the LDC's can absorb very

large quantitie s of foreign capital relative to what they now use without
appreciab ly affecting the stock of capital in the rest of the world or
raising its cost.

If this view is correct, it follows that it is the capital

importing countries and not the capital owners who lose most by the current
situation . In this regard we are in disagreem ent with such authors as
Hirschman (1969) who believes that foreign investmen t stifles domestic
capabilit ies and that divestmen t is desirable .
One exception to our general conclusio n involves situation s of monopoly.
If a host confronts a monopoli stic investor, the option of expropria tion
helps strengthe n the host's position.

In extreme cases,it is only through

threateni ng expropria tion that the host can get anything at all from a
foreign investor.

A similar situation would occur with respect to

repudiati on if one viewed foreign lenders as effective ly cartelize d.
A second area of exception occurs in certain narrowly defined industrie s
where LDC's may be important exporters .

In this case, the lack of capital

may limit the supply of output available to the developed countries , signific2 ntly
raising prices.

Indeed, these price increases may offset the decreased

sales sufficien tly that these LDC producers are better off.

The inability

of each LDC to forswear expropria tion substitut es for a cartel which the

LDC's m~y find difficult to organize.

While exceptions may exist to the position that the capital
importers bear the brunt of the present system, we believe that this view
serves as the best overall conclusion on the incidence issue.
follows that public policies

It thus

that discourage repudiation s and expropriati ons,

and encourage foreign investments , primarily benefit the LDC's.

Most public

policies in this area can be classified under information provision,
retaliation or insurance.
5.1 Information Provision
Because the cost of providing information is independent of the
number of individuals using it, information should be provided freely.
Such a rule presupposes that the cost of generating information should be
publicly borne.

In the internation al context, t~e natural organizatio ns to

provide information are the internation al institution s: the BIS, IMF, World
Bank and the UN.
There are two broad types of information ~:hat are required.

First

is information on the dependent variables of our discussion (amount of debt
and foreign direct invest~ent, their characteris r:ics and the incidence of
expropriati ons, repudiation s, defaults and other hostile acts).

The ~~fonna

tion on the financial side is extensive but could be improved (BIS, 19?9).
It is, however, far in advance of the availablf> information on foreign direct
investments .

No internation al organizatio n concerns itself in a comprehensi ve

way with this subject, which represents a pressing priority.

[For a survey

of some data sources in this area see Kobrin, (1980, Appendix 2)].

The second category of infonnation concerns the independent variables
of the system - country characteris tics relevant to decisions on financial
and physical investments .

Basic data on the situations of individual countries

are disseminate d by the internation al organizatio ns although more work on
making this information consistent across time and countries would be useful
to both the country analyst and academic researcher .
•f

The World Bank

performs a very valuable service by publishin g many country studies. ·An

.

important deficienc y is in knowledge about the l!-IF' s stabiliza tion programs
which are largely kept secret.

Reasons for some confiden tiality are clear

given the sensitivi ty of these negotiati ons but additiona l openess should be
possible.

5.2 Retaliati on
Legislati on in the U.S. penalizes countries taking hostile actions
against American companies in several ways: prohibiti ons of bilateral foreign
aid, exclusion from the generaliz ed system of trade preferenc es, and
oppositio n by U.S. represent atives to multilate ral aid.
The existence of penalties activated automatic ally by hostile acts
can play a valuable role in stabilizi ng internati onal investmen t.

If capital

importers know that retaliatio n will occur and if the ·penaltie s are sufficien tly
severe, hostile acts can be deterred.

In this situation investors may be

better off, since they have an opportun ity to in.vest not otherwise available .
Capital importers may also be better off, since they can obtain capital that
investors would not otherwise be willing to provide.

In effect, the potentia:

penalty serves as a form of collatera l for an LDC that it cannot otherwise
..·,:; ~ ...

give.

It may well be that the larger the penalty, the better off is the

capital importer.
On

the other hand, there may be situation s in which the capital

importer 's expected welfare at the time of the loan deteriora tes with higher
penalties .

For instance, the country may be required to repay regardles s

of future economic condition s, which it can neither control nor foresee. In

this case the option of default will have an insurance aspect, providing
•
as it does an opportuni ty to lessen obligatio ns under very bad circumsta nces.
An increase in the penalty, therefore , may lower the country's welfare

•

even t~ough its credit ceiling is raised, because the probabili ty of a large
penalty curtails this insurance aspect of lending.

We believe that this

-31-

situation is likely to be the exception.
Penalties in this system are only as important as the resolve of
the governments of rich countries to invoke them.

If the welfare of both

capital-importe rs and investors actually can be improved by the existence of
penalties, it is crucial that both groups perceive investor-countr y governnents as
committed to retaliation.

Decision makers must realize that the failure

to impose penalties may jeopardize the development prospects of poorer
countries by discouraging private investment.

Most analysts believe that

the threat of a cutoff of foreign aid, for instance, has been generally
ineffective (Kuhn, 1977, Lipson, 1976 and Olson, 1975).

It see~s that this

penalty has not be~n consistently applied and in any case requires that
aid to the particular country be large.

If this threat were viable, however, it

suggests a multipler role for aid since it can facilitate private capital flows.
One possibility is to let individual LDCs agree in advance to the
imposition of penalties in the event of hostile acts.

In this way, they can

legitimize such a nechanisrn and at the same time reveal the penalty level
they think best for their own welfare.

The Overseas Private Investment

Corporation, which is discussed below, embodies the spirit of this su~gestion
by requiring that host governments agree to conditions for resolving disputes
if they wish to be eligible for insured investments.
The international institutions can also play a role by organizing
embargoes and enforcing cohesion among private investors as well as by
using their political influence with the governments of investors.

The IMF,

for instance, has been a prominent actor in several reschedulings of bank
loans.

5.3 Insurance-The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provides insurance
to eligible private investors against various hostile acts (see Lipson, 1978).
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The insurance is limited to a maximum of 75 percent of the investment.
The Export-Impo rt Bank provides similar coverage to American exporters of
tangible goods.

This insurance extends to cover financial obligations for

which exports constitute security.

.

One difficulty with insurance schemes of this type is that the
capital importer has discretion over the hostile acts.

This problem

of moral hazard undermines the usefulness of these institution s, encouraging
Private investors

hostile acts without discouragin g private investment.

may be less determined to embargo loans to defaulting governments or to
defend themselves by other actions.

Proposals to make the IMF an internation al

lender of last resort also suffer from these same problems.
are not as

•evere

These drawbacks

.if the insurance is confined to unexpe~ted and un

controllabl e events such as war, revolution, or ~.nsurrectio n, and -- more
difficult to classify

natural or internation al events leading to poor

economic performance .
The fact that OPIC offers protection only up to 75 percent of an
investment provides some brake on any tendency of private investors t~-neglect the possibility of hostile acts.

And there are administrat ive·and

transaction s costs involved in obtaining compensatio n.

Finally, and most

important}~ OPIC can provide insurance only for investments in countries that are
unlikely to act against investments and can forbid future insured investments in any
country precipitatin g claims, a potential penalty.

For an investment in a

country to be eligible for OPIC coverage, that country's government must for
mally agree to a number of conditions, including the recognition of OPIC
as a successive claimant.

Thus OPIC provides an example of a mechanism where

by LDC governments can voluntarily increase the likelihood of a confrontati on
with the United States in the event that they interfere with private invest
ments.

It should be noted that OPIC concentrate s on physical investments

-33and is not at present an import ant insure r of financ ial investm ents.
Insuran ce schemes may not be a substit ute for penalt ies, but they
can complem ent retalia tory provisi ons by functio ning as tripwi res.

For

rs
instanc e, by transfe rring the burden of defaul t from private investo
of
to their governm ents, these arrange ments can strengt hen the resolve
these governm ents to impose sanctio ns.

.·•

Technic al Appendi x
Time Consiste nt Taxatio n and Expropr iation
of Foreign Capital
In this appendix we present a simple model illustra ting how
consiste nt behavio r.on the part

time

of borrowe rs·intera cts with

st~ateg ies of investo rs to produce capital market imperfe ctions.
moment

the defensh e

At any

the stock of foreign physica l capital invested in a host country

is given.

The host can, in princip le, tax the income from this capital

at any rate and in the extreme confisc ate it entirely .
the host's actions , the current supply
it is determin ed by past investm ents.

Regardl ess of

of capital is unaffec ted since
The factor constrai ning the host's

behavio r is the effect on the expecta tions of potenti al investo rs about
the host's future behavio r.

This impact on its reputati on may be sufficie nt

to make favorab le treatmen t of already invested foreign capital in the
host's own interes t.
:,.,:, ...

In develop ing these ideas we make the followin g assumpt ions:
(1)

Domestic product in period tis a function f(kt) where
kt is the stock of capital in the country in period t.
The function f(•) is increas ing and concave .

(2)

The stock of capital at time tis given in that period,
and consists of foreign- owned capital,

k:,

and domesti c

capital kD so that
t

(A. l)

'

Capital is assumed to depreci ate complet ely after one period.

...

''. '

(3)

The stock of domestic capital ktD

is

a constant ;-Dk, l· • e. ,

This assumption can be interpreted as meaning that the supply of domestic savings
~

is fixed at

kD

each period.

For our purposes an

equivalent assumption would be

that the installation of capital requires managerial services in fixed proportion
to the amount invested, and that the national

capacity to install capital is

kn.

Expropriation leads to the loss of future access to the installation capability of
foreign firms, which otherwise would be in infinitely elastic supply to a small
country.

In principle, the supply of national capital need not equal the capacity

to install capital, as we have assumed here for the sake of sim~licity.
(4) Capital can ~~rn· ~~-after.;.tax rate of ret~rn r·:i.n the
rest of the world.
(5)

In the absence of foreign investment, the marginal product
of capital in the host country exceeds the rest-of-world
after-tax interest rate, i.e.

(6)

Competition in domestic factor markets ensures that foreign
capital e~-rn~

(7)

it~ m~rginal product,

f'(k
. t·).- before tax.

In each period t the host chooses a tax rate •ton foreign
capital.

Given k!, national income in period tis
(A. 2)

.(8)

In any period t, the objective of the host

country's

taxation authority is the maximization of the present
discounted utility of income, W,
co

W = l:

es-t u(y )

s=t
where

e is

s

13<1

(A.3)

a discount factor and u(•) is an increasing

concave function.

~

-36-

(9)

Foreign investors behave atomistic ally.

That is. there are a large nwnber of foreign invc~tor3 , each of whom
makes a small contribut ion to kt+l in period tin anticipat ion of
earning an after-tax rate of return in period t+l of (1-T e t+l)

f'(kt+l).

Each investor' s contribut ion t-o kt+l is suffici.en tly small to allow him
to ignore the effect of his own contribut ion on the ap,~regate level of
k~+l • and hence on f' (kt+l). and on the tax rate expected to prevail in
the repayment period, Tet+l·

Thus each investor makes his investmen t

taking the expected after tax rate of return in the host country as given.
ln competiti ve.equilib rium, then, assumptio ns 1
and 9 together imply that
(A.4)

(10)

In some initial period 0, the host announces that the tax rate
in each.peri od t ~ 0 .will be Tt.

If the host deviates

from taxing at this rate in any periods >.O investors

-

-;~·, .. ·

will anticipat e full expropria tion (T-=1) in periods

If .the host deviates from its announced taxing sequence it can no
longer credibly maintain a reputatio n.

Having deviated from its announced

policy a host has no incentive not to tax all capital in place fully, since
to do otherwise will not increase its ability to attract capital in the
future.

If the host does decide to deviate from its announced strategy

{;t} in some period s. then it will optimally set 'tv-=1, v JSi i.e.

it will expropria te the current capital stock and any future investmen t.
h
· ·
ant~c1~at
Foreign· investors , O~$e~ving Ts r TS , w1l l ten
e Te = 1 , v>s;
V
17
and will not invest. Thus kF = 0, v >Sf
The present discounte d uti lit)'
V
-'

A

•

in periods of deviating from the announced strategy, which amounts to
expropriat:ng capital in place in that p~riod and becoming financially
X

autarkic thereafter, is defined as W6 where

lr6

= u{f(k )] + IB/(1-8)] u{f(kD)]

(A.5)

6

•
For the sequence {it} to be credible it must satisfy the time
A

consistency requirement that, at each period t,
uif(kt) - (1-;t) f'(kt) kFt] +

I

s=t+l

es-t{u[f(k) s t=O, ••• ,

{A.6)

co.

k!

-where
is defined implicitly by the equating of the world and anticipated
domestic after-tax rates of return. i.e ••
(1-~) f'(kD + 1?) er.
(A.7)
s
s
and
(A.8)

That is,

it mµst be optimal in each period for the host to maintain

the announced tax rate sequence rather than to expropriate the c.apital in place
in that period, and ruin its reputation as a host.
In period

n

v,

~1..-

1..uc:u,

the host chooses a tax rate

maximize its present discounted utility in period 0,

w0 ,

where
(A. 9)

subject to the constraints {A.6).

In period O, k~ is exogenous.

Fort> 0

...p

kt is given by (A.7).
Differentiating w0 with respect to it' i = 0, ••• ,

co•

we

obtain

{A.10 a)

(A.lOb)

To

determine the effect of a change in the tax T3te

T

t on

k:

differentiate

(A.7) to obtain
(A. 7')

which, of course, is negative whenever

l >Tt

~

0

Substituting (A.7') into (A.lOb) yields

t • 1,2 •...

(A.lOb')

which is negative whenever 1 > Tt > 0.

Ignoring the time-consistency c_cinstraints .(A.6), then, optimalhpblicy
A

will involve taxing initial capital fully (setting -r
A

subsequent investment .not at all (setting -rt

= 0;

-~

0

= 1) and taxing·

= 1,2 ..• );

thus a zero

tax on foreign capital is optimal for a small c01.mtry facing a given
world cost of capital r.

We denote the zero-tax capital stoc.k ask*,

determined implicitly by:

f' (k*) = r

(A.11)
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Having conunitted itself to a zero-tax policy, if the host country decides

-D
to tax capital in any later period t i t will have a national income of f(k)
in subsequent periods while obtaining up to f(k*) in period t.

For a policy

of not taxing capital at all to be time consistent requires, then, from
(A. 6). that

. u[f(k*)] + [8/(1-8)]
D
u(y *)/(1-8) 2:,
u[f(k )]

(A.13)

If the host country is risk neutral then we may set u(y).;, y.

Multiplying

( A.13) by (1- B) and rearranging gives

(A.13 ')

-D by a second-order Taylor-series around k.* and
Approximating f(k)
substituting the resulting expression into (A.13') yields the condition that
zero taxation of capital is time consistent if a,1d 0:1~:-

(A.13")

A host country is more likely to be capabl~ of sustaining zero taxation

of foreign capital if (i) its discount factor Bis near l; (ii) the
difference between the zero tax and autarkic capital stock (k * - k-[) )
is large, (iii) the ~ro<luction function is highly concave.

Since, from

{A.7), k* rises as r falls; zero taxation of foreign cauital is easier
to sustain when the world interest rate is low.
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If condition (A.13") does not obtain then zero taxation of· foreign capital
is not time consistent.

The constraints (A.6) are then binding.

Since

the constraint (A.6) takes ~he identical form for all periods t> 0
we may restrict ourselves to considering a taxation strategy that replicates

-

itself each period, i.e., in which the host announces a tax rate,
that will apply for all periods except the initial one.

To be time

con$istent, T must satisfy

u[fCk>
(A.14)
· where

k is defined

..

by

..

(1-t} £' (k) .. r

(A.15}

Consider again the case of risk neutrality where u(y)=y.

Multiplying

(A.14) by (1-S) and rearranging gives

(A.14')

Substituting (A.15) makes (A.14') become
- -D
B[f(k)
- f(k D)] - r(k-k)

>

O

(A.14")

Define the function

If X(k*) .::_ 0 then zero taxation of capital is time cor.sistent.

the condition X(k) .::_ 0 restricts the set of credible nolicies.

Otherwise,

.

''
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-D
Since x(k )

a:::

of capital greater than

0 and since x"(k) < 0 there is at most one level

kD

that satisfies x(k) = o.

If
(A.17)

then foreign investment at any positive level is not sustainable by a
time consistent policy.

Otherwise, some positive level of foreign

investment can be sustained.
If the constraint X(k) = 0 is binding note that: (i) an increase
in the disco1.D1t factor Braises the maximum sustainable capital stock;
(ii) an increase in the world interest rate reduces the maximum sustainable
capital stock; tiii) an increase

in

the domestic capital stock

kD

also

8
lowers the maximum sustainable capital stocJt- (i v)a n increase in the

domestic ~apital stock crowds out foreign capital on a more than one-for
one basis.

The reason is that an increase in

kt in~r~ases the welfare

of the host country should it expropriate, reducing its incentive to
abide by a given, preannounced tax rate.
Combining these results with those reported above leads to the

conclusion that countries with relatively low discount rates and limited
supplies of national capital are likely to treat foreign capital
more favorably.

Countries in which these magnitudes are very low will

not want to tax foreign capital at all, since sustaining perfect capital
mobility represents not only an optimal but a time consistent policy
for them.

Other countries, where discount rates are very high and other

sources of capital are readily available, may find that full expropriation
of all foreign assets is the only time consistent policy.

These countries

will find themselves shut out of private international capital markets.

Countries with intermediate values of Sand

kD

will sustain some capital

mobility, but they will tax foreign capital and the domestic marginal
product of capital will exceed the cost_ of ca~ital to the co\Ultry.
We have assumed that the production technology f(k) is the same
in all countries.

There are, of course, differences in the endowments

of other factors and in technologies.

Country characteristics that

augment the future marginal product of capital in the country, other
Such

things equal, make future access to foreign capital more desirable.
characteristics will increase the country's ability to borrow in the

We predict that countries that can benefit greatly in the future

present.

from foreign capital, e.g. because of vast natural resources and little
national ability to exploit them, can sustain larger levels of foreign
investment currently.
We have treated policy toward direct foreign investment as the
outcome of the maximization of a social utility function.

In fact,

policy is conducted by governments with objectives that can differ
from those of its citizens.

..,.,...

A new governments, for example, may

consider its reputation as independent of that of its predecessor.

It.

may consequently reformulate policy toward foreign investment upon assuming
power.

Such a reformulation could involve treating existing foreign-owned

assets as a legacy of the past, and taxing them at high levels.

The .

same government might then pursue a policy of attracting and treating
favorably

~

foreign investment.

Alternatively, a new government with an

1mcertain future may have a higher discount rate than the representative
individual, and thus tax foreign assets more heavily than would be
desirable from a national perspective.

The bad reputation that this policy
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creates would, with some probab ility, be inherit ed by anothe r governm ent
and hence be of less concern to the one curren tly in power.
Finally , we have calcula ted the level of foreign investm ent that
a country can sustain by compar ing its curren t and future investm ent
opport unities with its nationa l capita l resour ces.
more than one interna tional source of capita l.

There is, howeve r,

Some countr ies may

continu e to have access to one source even if they treat assets obtaine d
from anothe r source unfavo rably.

For exampl e, countr ies that are already

or willing to become members of the East Bloc may be less fearfu l of the
conseq uences of acting agains t foreign investo rs because they can turn
to other bloc members.

This phenomenon reduce s the equilib rium amount

of investm ent such countri es can obtain from private capita l market s.

NOTES
1.

Country risk that is solely exogenous can be analysed within the
confines of Markowit z's (1959) portfolio analysis.

Country risk

analysis of this form will involve identifyi ng the means, variances
and covarianc es of returns on investmen ts in different countries ,
which investors will then treat as parametr ic.
provides a recent example of this approach.

Goodman (1981)

When an endogenou s

component is recognize d; however, the parameter s of the asset
returns can be identifie d only by a game- theoretic analysis of the
relations hip between investors and recipient country governme nts.
2. ·A number of earlier authors (Bardhan, 1966, Breton, 1964 and Johnson,

1965) view foreign investmen t as inherentl y offensive to domestic
national ists.

This psychic commodity approach may have some

validity but becomes little more than a tautology when stretched
to explain w11y certain industrie s or firms and not others are objects
of country actions.

As we will argue throughou t, economic costs

do seem to affect the behavior of countries in many instances .

3.

First,

Two departure s from this viewpoint are particula rly important .

•t\·, -

decisions may reflect the wishes of the represent ative citizen, but
this citizen may be irrationa l.

Dror (1971) uses the concept of·a

"crazy state" to.charac terize this situation .

The case of Iran

provides a partial example where the analyst's main problem is
anticipat ing the goals of the country's behavior.

Second, decisions .

may be the outcome of conflict or compromise among citizens with
quite different goals and positions .

For instance, some states may

have political processes favoring owners of capital while others may

be oriented to urban workers or agricultu ralists.

Of particula r

concern are situation s where the weight of different groups in
decision-m aking may shift, or give rise to "voting paradoxes ".

4.

In focusing on country risk we shall not discuss the closely related
but analytically distinct issue of ~urrency risk which arises when
indirect investments are denominated in the currencies of different
countries.

In the absence of exact purchasing power parity currency

risk and country risk both act to reduce the mobJlity of funds
across borders.
5.

Despite these difficulties there are various cases where investors
have been able to impose considerable costs on countries ruled in
violation of contracts by another country's judicial system.

.

Recent

actions against the revolutionary regime in Iran certainly caused that
country considerable trouble (Field and Adam, 1980).

Moran (1973,

especially p. 286) describes a number of cases where he feels
successful legal action was taken against expropriating countries.

~

In many of these cases action could be taken to prevent other
businesses from purchasing raw materials from nationalized mines.
He reports that Kennecott even used an unconditional guarantee
embodied in i~s Chilean contracts to obtain writs of attachment
against the jets of Lanchile when they landed in New York.
6.

Much of the management literature on this subject has as its goal
acquainting managers with this aspect of investment.

See Vernon

(1967 and 1968), Smith and Wells (1975) and Wells (1977).
7.

This section draws heavily on our previous work (Eaton and Gersovitz,
1980, 1981a and 1981b),

8.

The World Bank in its publication World Debt Tables (1981, p. xv)
1980, p. 29) reports this information on a country by country basis.
These figures include debt outstanding and disbursed.

9.

On contrasts between bond and bank lending, see Eaton and Gersovitz
(19'8lb, p. 14 and pp. 22-26).

10.

See, for instance, various issues of Euromoney, and the Economist
Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Quarterly Economic Revie~~of individual countries.

11.

Creditors may also be able to interfere directly with a borrower's
trade by harassing :importers or exporters in the creditors' ·country
·through the court system (Delupis, 1973), but this is probably not
a generally effective strategy.

Creditor-country governments may

retaliate through trade embargoes.
12.

Formal empirical evidence on the existence of credit ceilings, the
determinants of default probabilities and interest rate spreads is
discussed elsewhere by us (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981b, pp. 16-24 and
27-31).

13.

This account draws on Cline {1982), Derecho (1978), Downer (1980),
Kuczynski (1977), Nevans (1978) and EIU (1975-1981).

14.

In Eaton and Gersovitz (198.2) we present a number of formal models
illustrating some of the points discussed in this section.

Other

theoretical work on this topic include Cauas an~ Selowsky (1977) and
Tobin (1974).

These authors put special emphasis on aspects of incom~

distribution among groups within the host country as a result of
expropriation.

This type of issue, discussed also by us in Eaton and ..

Gersovitz (1982), is very important but has been pushed into the.
background in this paper by our assumption of the representative..citizen .
15.

Cobbe (1979) provides a detailed discussion of relations between
governments and foreign investors focussed entirely on the mining sector.

16.

We rely on parts of our previous work (Eaton and Gersovitz, 198lb, pp.
32-36) for many of the arguments presented here.

This earlier work con

tains citations to the exact sources of legislative acts.
17.

We have earlier used this type of equilibrium concept in Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981a).

Examples of more recent work on related topics

include that by Dybvig and Spatt (1989) who a~~ly this same equili
b~ium concept to examine a firm's incentive to maintain a reputation
for product quality.

Selten (1975) discusses this concept under the

~

name subgame perfect equilibrium .

The equilibrium is one in which

an agent makes a precoTill'litment to a certain course of action.

This

precor:unitme nt is an equilibrium one only if it is then always in that
agent's interest to pursue the announced course of action.

Subject

to this constraint the announced course of action maximizes that agent's
objective function.
18.

These results follow from the fact that an incr~ase in rand decrease in B shift
the locus

downward, as does an increase in

does not obtain, so that

~

>

kD.

·i

-D
k

if (A.17)

...
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